The early relationship between UNESCO and the IOC: Considerations – Controversies – Cooperation

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Abstract

Today, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation is "the United Nations' lead agency for physical education and sport". It runs several projects and initiatives and it closely cooperates with various international organisations that are engaged in the field of sport and physical education. The questions as to how and why sport became part of UNESCO's programme and who were the involved participants, however, remain unanswered in academic literature. This article shows that after the introduction of the idea to include sport and physical education in its programme by individual sports officials, with members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) playing a key role, UNESCO had to overcome severe controversies, jealousies and power struggles when trying to position itself in the field. Particularly, the relationship between UNESCO and the IOC was difficult – the general problems of international sports, and consequently the IOC, were mirrored in the process of UNESCO's early involvement in sport. In order to elucidate the development of UNESCO's engagement in international sport until the early 1970s, the research utilises the qualitative research method of hermeneutics and analyses archive material from the Carl und Liselott Diem-Archive at the German Sport University Cologne, the IOC Archive in Lausanne, the UNESCO Archive in Paris and the Avery Brundage Collection of the University of Illinois at Aubana-Champaign Archives.

Keywords

UNESCO, IOC, fair-play trophy, 10th Olympic Congress Varna, apolitical sport, amateurism, educational value of sport.

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Introduction

The preamble of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation's (UNESCO) Constitution states, "[…] since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed [...]" (UNESCO, 1945, 1). It was in this same sense that Pierre de Coubertin initiated the modern Olympic Games in the late 19th century: the international sports event was an "opportunity for international contact" (Lenk, 1964, 120), which should contribute to the reduction of prejudices, hatred and distrust (Wassong, 2010).

Therefore, as the French journalist Jean-François Brisson expressed it in retrospect in 1964, the newly established "U.N.E.S.C.O. could not remain aloof from sport" (Brisson, 1964). Considering the congruency between their visions and missions, international scopes and current relationship, cooperation between the IOC and UNESCO seems obvious and natural – their commonalities have also recently been fostered again when the United Nations' (UN) Secretary-General stated that "Olympic principles are United Nations principles" (Bach, 2014). However, the positioning of UNESCO in the field of physical education and sport and the establishment of a productive relationship between the two organisations were outcomes of two decades of considerations, controversies and cooperation (Bailey, 1996).

Inclusion of sport in the programme of UNESCO

Among the early advocates for sport and physical education to be included in UNESCO's programme, those related to the IOC were most influential. In particular, it was the members of the French Delegation in UNESCO, and presumably the IOC's Vice President Armand Massard[1], who drew UNESCO's awareness to the potential of sport and physical education proceeding 1947 (Massard, November 1952). The approaches in this regard were motivated by aspirations to become partners with – if not the representatives of – UNESCO in the field of sport (IOC, 1953). Massard's initiatives finally found approval within UNESCO, whereby the intergovernmental organisation became active in the field of sport for the first time in 1952: during the UNESCO Executive Board's meeting on November 5th, 1952, Director-General Jaime Torres-Bodet recalled:

1. Armand Émile Nicolas Massard (1884-1971) was a French Olympic champion in fencing in 1920 and 1924. Beyond his athletic career, he was journalist and president of the French National Olympic Committee (NOC) and the French Fencing federation.

> That the Executive Board had authorized Unesco to be represented by an observer at the Olympic Games held in Helsinki the summer of 1952. As a result informal relations had been initiated between Unesco and the International Olympic Games Committee. Although no official request had yet been received from the latter, he hoped that the Board would agree to recommend to the Conference that the Committee should, if so desired, be represented by an observer at the Seventh Session. Collaboration between the two bodies would be of interest for Unesco's youth activities (UNESCO, 1952a).

Whilst Torres-Bodet gave mention to 'informal relations', a correspondence between IOC President Avery Brundage and Armand Massard proves that Brundage was neither informed on Massard's approaches toward UNESCO nor interested in cooperation with the international organisation (Brundage & Massard, 1952). Beyond Massard's passive representation of the IOC in the conference, the IOC President thus inhibited any further engagement which would lead to collaboration and cooperation with UNESCO (Brundage & Massard, 1954). Accordingly, Massard could not pursue the achievements he had made with UNESCO and had to resort to brushing aside his idea that the IOC could become the representative organisation of a future sports section in UNESCO (Massard, November 1952).

UNESCO's wish for cooperation with the IOC

On the other side, René Maheu[2] was convinced of the necessity to join forces with the IOC due to the problems that threatened amateur sports and consequently the educational value of sport and physical education. For this purpose, he considered the IOC to be a "competent international organisation" which was predestined for UNESCO cooperation and collaboration – and he was not aware of Brundage's negative attitude towards his ideas. In a letter to Armand Massard after the 7th session of UNESCO's general conference in December 1952, Maheu mentioned the need for acquiring the member states' consent in order to make decisions on possibilities for cooperation and collaboration with external organisations. In this context, he stressed that, initially, they had to be careful concerning the role of the IOC if they wanted to realise their ambitious aims afterwards (Maheu,

2. René Gabriel Eugène Maheu (1905-1975) was a French professor of philosophy and before being elected Director-General of UNESCO in 1962 until 1974, he was appointed Director of the Executive Office of UNESCO's Director-General in 1949 (Munziner, 1976).

December 1952). This indicates that the decision to engage in the field of sport had already been taken on UNESCO's executive level. On the basis of Resolution No. 1.353, which was adopted at the 7th session of the general conference in 1952, the organisation conducted two enquiries, in 1953 and 1955, on "The Place of Sport in Education" in order to gain approval by its member states and thus legitimise future action (UNESCO, 1952b). The enquiries addressed UNESCO member states as well as relevant international organisations engaged in the field of sport and physical education, including the IOC. Among the member states, a positive attitude towards engaging UNESCO in the field of sport in general could be identified within both the 1953 and 1955 enquiries. On the part of the IOC, however, Brundage and Massard agreed that they should "confine [themselves] to generalities" (Brundage, March 1954). Due to this reluctant behaviour, the IOC was not included in the second enquiry in 1955.

In addition to the IOC's own averseness, the controversial positions of the member states and NGOs who responded to the surveys made the realisation of the initial intention to establish a close relationship with the IOC rather unlikely: there was a widespread scepticism towards the IOC and the Olympic Games' educational impact, with several international sport officials expressing their critical opinion about the IOC. In retrospect, Carl Diem described the IOC as a body that was reduced to the organisation of the Olympic Games, while it ignored their cultural, artistic and scientific facets (Diem, 1958). Diem was not alone in his opinion: at the "International Conference on Sport and Health", in the lead up to the Oslo Winter Olympic Games in 1952, the IOC was referred to as "a self-constituted international organization with the sole task of arranging the Olympic Games every four years" (Johansen, 1952, 38).

Nevertheless, UNESCO continued to make regular – unsuccessful – attempts to win over the IOC. The reasons for this continuous quest to cooperate with the IOC are reflected in Director-General René Maheu's statement arguing that sport was "one of the most vigorous forces in international relations. There [were] few international exchanges, encounters or contacts which arouse so much mass feeling as sports events". UNESCO principally considered the IOC as a perfect fit for its intentions in the field of sport due to the IOC's traditional educational ideals and the unquestioned primacy of the Olympic Games (Maheu, 1964, 4ff).[3]

3. Maheu's wording is closely related to Pierre de Coubertin's statements about the Olympic Games and clearly mirrors Maheu's commitment to the idea and the value of the Olympic Games.

According to UNESCO, however, the tense political situation in the post-war period was a major threat to sport's positive social influence and educational value. As a consequence, UNESCO saw a need in sport for intervention and proper, modern regulation (ibid, 5). The responsibility for the regulation of international sports in general, and specifically for amendments of the Olympic Games as the most prestigious international sports event, although, was to be found in the realm of the IOC. Yet, in the eyes of UNESCO, the IOC did not take necessary action in this pursuit. Rather than opposing the IOC, however, this fuelled UNESCO's zeal to form a partnership with them in order to exercise influence on the development of international sports. The IOC, for its part, remained reluctant and unyielding towards any kind of external influence on its structures. This decision had a huge impact on the early engagement of UNESCO: As the sport historian Don Anthony expressed it, "UNESCO was [thus] given a more or less free run" in the field of international sport politics and it became active independent from the IOC (Anthony, 1995, 42). Consequently, the actions of both the IOC, in its unwillingness to cooperate, and UNESCO, in 'going it alone', resulted in severe tensions between the two organisations.

Situation of the IOC

The Olympic Charter adopted in 1955 reveals the self-conception and major focus of the IOC in this study's examined period: the regulation and regular celebration of the Olympic Summer and Winter Games and the direction of the Olympic Movement constituted its main tasks (IOC, 1955). Even though the IOC's statutes repeatedly referred to the educational intentions of the founding father Pierre de Coubertin, the IOC delegated the actual responsibility for "the promotion and encouragement of the physical, moral and cultural education of the youth" and for "the development of character, good health and good citizenship" to the NOCs (ibid.).

Already in the early 20th century, the IOC's priorities lay in organisational matters. As a consequence, several initiatives focusing on the educational and recreational aspects of sport and on mass participation were created independent from the IOC. Examples for this include the International Olympic Institute, founded in Berlin in 1938, and the International Olympic Academy (IOA) in Olympia, Greece which was finally opened in 1961 –

both initiatives were achievements of Carl Diem, who upheld the educative motives of Pierre de Coubertin in the realm of the IOC (Müller, 1989). Avery Brundage's statement that he expected the IOA to make valuable contributions to the solution of pressing problems within the Olympic Movement – problems that the IOC could not solve on its own due to the extraordinary development of the Olympic Games – proves that the IOC intended to outsource educational responsibilities while still profiting from education's contribution (Müller, 1983). Another example was the First International Recreation Congress, held in Los Angeles in 1932, which was organised in order to "revive the original connection […] between the elite sporting spectacles […] and […] active mass recreation for modern societies" (Wassong, 2015, 222).

This development of the IOC to move away from its initial educational purpose escalated in the post-war period, intensified by the IOC's financial and structural difficulties. The IOC suffered from a loss of prestige and power and the fact that it had ceased to organise Olympic Congresses since the 9th Congress in Berlin in 1930 also revealed that there were internal struggles within the Olympic Movement: The relationship between the growing number of NOCs and International Federations (IF) and the IOC became increasingly difficult, fuelled by the problem of amateurism, which constituted a serious menace of conflict and disaccord (Müller, 1983). The Council of Delegates, which had been established at the 9th Olympic Congress in Berlin, was a welcome means for the IOC to appease the NOCs and IFs. The IOC presented it as a framework for discussion of fundamental matters among the stakeholders of the Olympic Movement – which made the organisation of an Olympic Congress redundant and thus the IOC could avoid the threat of being outvoted in the course of an assembly (Müller, 1983).

Points of conflict between the IOC and UNESCO

Despite the IOC's refusal to cooperate, UNESCO, with its Director-General René Maheu from 1962-1974 playing a key role in this respect, continually approached the IOC and invited representatives to its sport-related meetings, seminars and projects. For the Olympic Movement, cooperation with the newly established global institution UNESCO could have offered a potential for increased global influence and power and thus also financial benefits. For that reason, Armand Massard had been

keen to convince UNESCO of the educational potentials of sport and physical education in the early 1950s and had advocated for the formation of a specific section for sport attached to UNESCO, in which the IOC would play a leading role (Massard, November 1952). In contrast to Massard however, the IOC President did not appreciate the idea of becoming linked to UNESCO. In a letter to the Frenchman relating to UNESCO's enquiry in 1954, Brundage's attitude towards UNESCO became obvious when he stated that:

> […] there has been considerable adverse criticism of some Unesco actions and I don't think we want to get so close that we would be bound by any foolish thing that might be done by this organisation (Brundage, March 1954).

Besides his expressed doubts about the reputation and possible future achievements of UNESCO, Brundage was worried about the preservation of the internal unity of the Olympic Movement, which he considered to be necessary in order to stand firm against external influences. With this in mind, his personality decisively influenced the IOC, as his strict and resolute style of leadership did not leave much space for individual action among members of the Olympic Movement and particularly the IOC.[4]

Amateurism

In Brundage's view, the stability as well as the autonomy of the Olympic Movement could only be maintained by rejecting any and all potential external influences or interferences to the Olympic Movement (Streppelhoff, 2014). In this respect, the amateur problem turned out to be an important and central problem not only for world sport and the Olympic Movement, but also especially for Avery Brundage's basic understanding of the Olympic idea. According to Müller (1983), this was how and why Brundage fought against the prospect of attempts to soften the amateur rules. In 1963, Brundage stated that:

> The first and most important of these rules, for good reasons, was that the Games must be amateur. They are not a commercial enterprise and no one [...] is permitted to use them for profit (Brundage, 1963).

One year later, he even stated that professional sport was only "a branch of entertainment business and not sport at all" (IOC, 1969). Brundage was convinced that a liberalisation of the amateur regulations would lead to the ruin of the Olympic Games. This conservative attitude of his towards the amateur

4. This attitude became obvious in the case of the Indian IOC member Sondhi, who had participated in a congress of UNESCO in 1963. His engagement was fiercely criticised by Brundage and Massard. The French vice-president of the IOC said in his letter to Brundage that "decidement l'unité du CIO craque par tous les bords" and he thus saw the unity of the IOC threatened by individual actions of IOC members (Massard, December 1963).

problem was, however, programmatic for the Olympic Movement – and consequently for international sports in general. This was the case as, due to the unequalled popularity and prestige of the Olympic Games, the rules that applied for the Olympic Games had become the standards for all international sports and competitions.Thus, the IOC as the highest authority of the Olympic Movement was also the highest authority of international sports rules and regulations (Glader, 1978, 129). Even though the amateur regulations officially fell under the responsibility of the International Federations since a congress of the IFs, NOCs and the IOC in Lausanne in 1921 (ibid., 137f), this statute was only valid in theory, as the IOC had a decisive influence on the IFs' regulations.[5] This influence of the IOC becomes evident, for example, through the athletes, at the time, having to declare that they followed the rules of the IFs – which differed among the different organisations – alongside their compliance with the IOC's definition of an amateur (Glader, 1978). The IOC's definition of an amateur was amended and became more diversified and restrictive in the following years – with its traditionalistic character constituting a key aspect for conflict between UNESCO and the IOC in the 1960s. Similar to Brundage, UNESCO considered the amateur problem as a severe threat to the educational value of sport.

In contrast to the IOC, however, UNESCO drew the conclusion that there was a need for fundamental changes – and it was in this sense that they called for revision and modification of the traditionalistic rules and regulations – that would safeguard the educational value of sport (Maheu, 1964, 7). In his article on the potential of sport for society, René Maheu considered the pressure on the athletes who were forced to hide their professionalism – "imposing falsehood on the élite" – as the actual problem in international sport. Correspondingly, Maheu stated in the foreword of the "Declaration on Sport" that the champion was "obliged to choose between an amateurism, which [was] quite obviously materially incompatible with the technical requirements of top-level athletic events, and a professionalism which [excluded] him from some of the greatest contests, among them the Olympic Games" (ICSPE and UNESCO, n.d., 5f). Thus, he did not consider international sport – and consequently the IOC – to be the victim of the amateur issue. Rather, Maheu claimed that the IOC's regulations were actually the cause for the problem and questioned the wisdom of the amateur rule:

5. The example of the Skiing Federation in 1938 shows the power of the IOC in questions of amateur regulations: If an IF did not comply with the IOC's ideas, it risked that the respective sport was excluded from the next Olympic Games. The president of the International Skiing Federation had attempted to allow skiing instructors to participate in the Olympic Games, which was against the IOC's regulations. As a consequence, skiing was skipped from the programme of the Winter Olympic Games in Sapporo in 1940, which were finally postponed due to World War II (Glader, 1978).

> Why should we be so reluctant to admit that he is a professional? […] Why should we think that money (or some equivalent material gain) dishonours athletic champions when it does not dishonour poets?" (Maheu, 1964, 8).

This of course was a clear provocation towards the IOC and Brundage personally, who often justified his strict attitude towards the amateur regulation with the comparison of sport to fine arts, which in his eyes was performed disinterestedly (IOC, 1969, 68). Comparable critical comments and claims of UNESCO members progressively increased the gap between the two organisations: Brundage frequently complained about members and sympathisers of UNESCO, who claimed that 'social injustice' and 'shamateurism' were created by Olympic regulations (Brundage, June 1964).

Apolitical Sport

Another point of conflict between UNESCO and the IOC was Brundage's – and thus the IOC's – maxim of "apolitical sport" and of its independence, which resulted in a categorical rejection of any interference of a governmental institution in the IOC's business (Streppelhoff, 2014, 47). This attitude was emphasised already in 1956 when the Chancellor of the IOC, Otto Mayer, answered a request to invite a representative of UNESCO to be an observer to the Olympic Games in Melbourne. Therewith, Mayer stated that, in conforming to its Charter, the IOC was only focussed on controlling the Olympic Games and that any action that was not directly linked to this task would not be considered by the IOC (Mayer, October 1956). In addition, the IOC's refusal to associate with governmental institutions – which clearly applied to UNESCO – was stressed. Besides the rejection of governmental interference in the IOC's direct competencies and thus international sports, this also implied that involvement on the national level in NOC's administrative and technical questions could not be tolerated. This delineation can be determined on account of such matters also falling under the exclusive responsibility of the IOC, the NOCs and IFs (ibid.). The IOC resolutely stuck to this attitude in the following two decades, even though it had substantial difficulties putting it into practice. Mostly due to the Cold War and the resulting political tensions, the IOC was confronted with complex political problems such as the acknowledgement of new NOCs, visa issues for international competitions and the "Two Chinas" conflict in the 1950s-1970s (Streppelhoff, 2014, 47). Even when facing such challenges however, the IOC continued to categorically block the

attempts of UNESCO to build a relationship and offer support. Furthermore, UNESCO's appeal for the internationalisation of sport, as well as its understanding of sport as an activity that had to adapt to the diverse necessities of the contemporary world, were contrary to the IOC's attitude and served as sources of conflict (Desplechin-Lejeune et al., 2008). Resultantly, the IOC considered UNESCO's engagement as "tentative, peu subtile, de prise de contrôle des Jeux Olympiques" (Miller, 1992).

"Comité des Trophées du 'Fair-Play' Pierre de Coubertin"

The issues of the amateur question and the refusal of political interference in sport were the reasons the IOC put forward to justify its rejection of UNESCO's proposals for cooperation. The situation became increasingly complex, not least due to the IOC's fear that the intergovernmental organisation would take over control of international sport. This fear became evident with the release of IOC Secretary-General Johann Westerhoff's statement within his letter concerning the "Comité des Trophées du 'Fair-Play' Pierre de Coubertin" in 1967. Therein, he informed his colleague Pierre Chavan about UNESCO's – and particularly René Maheu's – intentions in international sports:

> Vous savez sans doute que le désir – inavoué peut-être – de M. Maheu, directeur général de l'UNESCO, est de prendre la tête du Mouvement olympique. Ses idées sur l'amateurisme vont entièrement à l'encontre de celles que Pierre de Coubertin a toujours défendues tout au long de sa vie. (Westerhoff, Mai 1968).

Besides revealing its envy towards UNESCO's project and disapproval for UNESCO's engagement in sport generally, the IOC furthermore claimed that UNESCO had ignored and excluded it from its projects. In 1968, Westerhoff complained that UNESCO had not invited the IOC to contribute, or to take position in the project of the Fair-Play trophies (Westerhoff, June 1968). A correspondence between the IOC's secretary Lydie Zanchi and Jean Borotra in December 1965, however, proves that the IOC had been invited repeatedly but that it had "decided not to accept the collaboration" (Zanchi, December 1965). Furthermore, the letter reads that the IOC preferred to limit its engagement to distributing its own trophies. Thus, the IOC did not react officially to the initiative and chose not to accept the invitation to become part of it. Finally, Brundage even pointed out that the project was superfluous because fair-play was inherent in amateurism

and therefore fundamental to the Olympic Games (Brundage, February 02, 1964). Bearing the IOC's dismissal in mind, the IOC actually went on to contact the descendants of Pierre de Coubertin in order to ask whether they had been informed about the undertaking and whether they agreed on the use of de Coubertin's name. This action clearly demonstrates the IOC's envy and disapproval concerning the initiative and UNESCO – the IOC perceived the project as a provocation and an intrusion into its realm (Westerhoff, Mai 1968).

Hardened fronts between the IOC and UNESCO

The case of the Fair-Play trophies in the name of Pierre de Coubertin was a significant milestone within the history of the two organisations, with the IOC's conduction in this debacle mirroring that of its overall attitude and behaviour in the respective period. In keeping with how it dealt with UNESCO, the IOC maintained its distance from new projects and blocked any external invitation to get involved. Falling back on its tradition, it considered its interpretation of Olympism as the universal understanding and was not willing to innovate or to develop it further. This reaction reflected the actual problem of the IOC at the time: it perceived its position to be threatened and saw the need to defend its field of competency.[6] Thus, rather than focussing on proactive solutions to the actual problems facing international sport at the time – such as promoting fair-play and the educational value of sport – it was occupied with questions of competencies and responsibilities and accordingly with power struggles among (sport) organisations.

In reaction to the IOC's traditionalism, UNESCO considered it necessary to contribute and to exert influence on sport so that it would maintain, or probably even regain, its educational value. Hence, on the basis of the categorical rejection by the IOC, it took individual action. The result of this was that both organisations had the same field of interest and – taking the purpose statements of both organisations as a basis – the same aim, but each with a different approach to the problem. This is how UNESCO became the counterpart of the IOC. While UNESCO considered political interference and the loosening of the amateur rule as the solution to the most pressing problems of world sport, the IOC argued that these measures were exactly the reasons for the struggles taking place in sport. Therefore, conflict between the two organisations was unavoidable. In addition to these opposing fundamental understandings, personal envies were also important factors.

6. Considering the suggestion of the UNESCO to take responsibility of selected events of the Olympic Games in the context of the enquiry on sport, this fear was not groundless (UNESCO Department of Education, July 1953).

Maheu's bold manners and his open criticism clashed with the more sensitive and vulnerable IOC in its delicate situation. All these aspects gradually led to the deepening of the gap between the two organisations.

Solution of the conflict

The IOC's constant and categorical refusal to cooperate with UNESCO primarily stemmed from its internal insecurity and instability as well as the resulting fear that the new organisations could become too strong and thus easily take over control of international sport and the IOC. Due to the latent internal disunity of the Olympic Movement, Brundage had been unwilling to enter into dialogue with its in-house stakeholders – particularly the NOCs and the IFs – whereby he had slowed down the development of the Movement in general. The late 1960s, however, were characterised by a growing self-confidence, the strife for the right of co-determination and thus the growing pressure of NOCs and IFs on the IOC.[7] This development finally resulted in several alterations in the Olympic Movement, which were launched in the course of the 67th IOC Session in Mexico in 1968: Based on the insistent suggestions of the NOC's, a major outcome of the Session was the decision to organise a 10th Olympic Congress (IOC, 1968, 28). Brundage was not convinced of the idea but was outvoted and therefore declared that "although no decision could be taken at such a Congress, it might be a good idea from a social point of view to re-establish contacts" (IOC, 1968, 45).

The first Olympic Congress since 1930 finally took place from September 30th until October 4th, 1973 in Varna, Bulgaria. The thematic foci of the congress entailed 1) the "re-definition of the Olympic Movement and its future", 2) the "relations between the International Olympic Committee, the International Federations and the National Olympic Committees" and 3) "the pattern of future Olympic Games and the consequences". They reflected the awareness of the need to adapt the Olympic Movement to the current circumstances – to modernise it – in order to be able to sustain it in the future (IOC, 1972a, 414). Even though no official resolutions were formulated at the Congress, its impact was ground breaking in many respects. Among other novelties, the "tripartite commission […] was maintained as a standing commission" and "in future an Olympic Congress would be held every eight years" (IOC, 1974, 12). A path breaking innovation was

7. Both, NOCs and IFs, joined forces and established the "Assemblée Générale Permanente des Comités Nationaux Olympiques" (AGPCNO) (1966), and the "Assemblée Générale des Fédérations Internationales" (AGFI) (1967) (Müller, 1983, 128).

the liberalisation of the amateur regulation, which was discussed in Varna and finally approved by the IOC in Vienna during its 75th session in 1974 (Müller, 1983, 137). The new amateur regulation gave unprecedented authority to the IFs. Among other impacts, it allowed compensation for the time spent for training and for participating in international competitions for the first time. Furthermore, "state amateurs" and college athletes were absolved (Glader, 1978, 160ff).[8] Another, even though rather secondary innovation, was the decision to seek governmental assistance in order to develop and promote sport more effectively and efficiently on the national level (Müller, 1983, 133).

Besides the results of the congress itself, the preparations for the Congress – in which representatives of the NOCs, the IFs and the IOC were involved – already had a massive impact on the Olympic Movement. This "tripartite commission" can by now be understood as a first step towards the harmonisation between these groups (Müller, 1983, 128f). Also, Brundage's successor as IOC president, Lord Killanin, was a member of the tripartite commission and hence was involved in the IOC's opening process from the very beginning (ibid.).

One aspect constituting evidence for proof of the opening up of Olympic Movement's stakeholders towards external influences in the run-up to the 10th Olympic Congress in Varna is that of the programme of the Scientific Congress, which was prepared by the Organising Committee of the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972. Apparently, this had fuelled Brundage's disapproval and he even suspected the Scientific Congress of being controlled by UNESCO. This suspicion was probably due to René Maheu's announced contribution to the event, entitled "The role of sport in promoting international understanding and peace" (Bundesinstitut für Sportwissenschaft, 1972). Prior to the Scientific Congress at the 72nd IOC Session in Sapporo in 1972, Brundage had "questioned Mr. Daume closely on the truth of whether this Congress was under the auspices of UNESCO (as had happened at other Olympic Games) or patronised by the Organising Committee" (IOC, 1972b). This wording was characteristic of his attitude and fear that the IOC would lose control. Willi Daume, however, had responded:

> That the Science Congress was Munich's way of trying to revive one of the ideas of Pierre de Coubertin […]. It was in no way connected with the political body of UNESCO

8. These changes were corresponding to the UNESCO's – and particularly Maheu's – suggestions.

> and had aroused a considerable interest from all over the world. The need for such a Congress was evident and thus it was being held within the framework of the Olympic Movement. (ibid.)

Another indication for the opening up of the Olympic Movement was the NOC's suggestion, during the 69th IOC Session in Amsterdam in 1970, to invite observers to the 10th Olympic Congress in Varna: besides representatives of non-Olympic international federations, recognised international organisations and "persons responsible at national level for physical education and sport" were to be invited (IOC, 1970, 119f).

This development paved the way for the actual reconciliation between the IOC and UNESCO in 1973 – also prior to the 10th Olympic Congress. It became obvious that for the relaxation of the relationship between the IOC and UNESCO, there was a need for an internal reorganisation of the IOC. Eventually, the IOC's fear of losing control and authority due to the congress and the decisions taken in its framework – Brundage had "warned the Assembly that while the Congress can demonstrate a solidarity, it may also demonstrate a lack of solidarity" – turned out to be needless (IOC, 1970, 23). The Olympic Movement emerged from the congress – and more importantly, from its meticulous preparations – stronger and more confident (Müller, 1983, 136). This was because the stakeholders realised the possibility to constructively contribute to the Movement and its future development as well as the need for unification if they wished to defend their interests from external pressures. Finally, it was this internal strengthening of the Movement which made the solution of the conflict between the IOC and UNESCO possible. The actual conciliation finally took place when the new IOC President Lord Killanin, who had been elected just after the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972, initiated direct dialogue with the Director-General of UNESCO, René Maheu, prior to the Second All-Africa Games in Lagos in January 1973.

Conclusion

After two decades of considerations and controversies, time had come for cooperation. Even though the actual conflict resolution between UNESCO and the IOC was rather unspectacular, for it was the consequence of the Olympic Movement's internal

development, its impact on the world of sport was immense. Lord Killanin stated that "the IOC was no longer as traditionalist as in the past but, on the contrary, was becoming more and more democratic and open and was moving with the times, especially since the Congress of Varna" (CIGEPS, 1979, 9).[9] Likewise, UNESCO also had to change its attitudes and its activities in the field of physical education and sport. The inertness and the lack of engagement of the IOC paved the way for UNESCO to be involved in sport. Therefore, UNESCO had engaged in "The Role of Sport in Education" and for two decades it had constantly played the role of the counterpart to the IOC. The modernisation of the Olympic Movement's structures, thus, certainly implied a need for repositioning and reorientation of UNESCO. Moreover, the IOC's change of attitude did not only affect its relationship with UNESCO, but it also opened the international sport world to governmental organisations in general. UNESCO seized the opportunity and "created a framework for co-operation between government authorities and voluntary sports organizations on a national and international scale, with the Olympic Movement at the forefront" (Siperco, 1989).

9. Despite its modernisation, the IOC had to face severe problems in the following decades. Particularly the boycotts of the Olympic Games in 1980 and 1984 mirrored the serious situation of the Olympic Movement.

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